UFOs & Disclosure

 Abramson, Harold Alexander – [20 Pages, 9.9 MB] – Harold Alexander Abramson (November 27, 1899 – September 1980) was an American physician (allergist and pediatrician) noted as an early advocate of therapeutic LSD. He played a significant role in CIA’s MKULTRA program to investigate the military applications of LSD.

Angleton, James Jesus – FBI Release #1 – [347 Pages, 83.4 MB] Angleton, James Jesus – FBI Release #2 (Final) – [97 Pages, 7MB] – James Jesus Angleton (December 9, 1917 – May 11, 1987) was chief of CIA Counterintelligence from 1954 to 1975. His official position within the organization was “Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Counterintelligence (ADDOCI)”. Angleton was significantly involved in the U.S. response to the purported KGB defectors Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko. Angleton later became convinced the CIA harbored a high-ranking mole, and engaged in an intensive search. Whether this was a highly destructive witch hunt or appropriate caution vindicated by later moles remains a subject of intense historical debate.

 Bissell, Richard – FBI Release #1 – [36 Pages, 3MB] Bissell, Richard – FBI Release #2 – [9 Pages, 3.5MB] – Richard Mervin Bissell Jr. (September 18, 1909 – February 7, 1994) was a Central Intelligence Agency officer responsible for major projects such as the U-2 spy plane and the Bay of Pigs Invasion.

 Buckley, William Francis – William Francis Buckley (May 30, 1928 – June 3, 1985) was a United States Army officer and CIA station chief in Beirut from 1984 until 1985. His cover was as a Political Officer at the US Embassy.  He died on or around June 3, 1985—five months before the date claimed by his captors—while in the custody of Hezbollah. He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery and is commemorated with a star on the Memorial Wall at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Colby, William – FBI Release #1 – [128 Pages, 8.7MB] –Colby, William – FBI Release #2 – [134 Pages, 9.5MB] – William Egan Colby (1920-1996) was an American intelligence officer and diplomat who served as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1973 to 1976 during a transformative period for the U.S. intelligence community. A World War II veteran and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative, Colby had a long, varied career in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), beginning in 1950. He was instrumental in controversial covert actions like the Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War, aimed at dismantling the Viet Cong’s infrastructure. As DCI, Colby faced a tumultuous time marked by increased scrutiny of CIA activities; he was a key figure during the Church Committee hearings of the 1970s, where he divulged classified information about the Agency’s questionable practices, leading to significant changes in oversight and control of American intelligence operations. His candid approach brought both commendation for transparency and criticism for revealing too much, the latter leading to his forced resignation in 1976.

 Conein, Lucien – [45 Pages, 8.3MB] – Lt. Col. Lucien Emile Conein (born 29 November 1919, Paris, France – died 3 June 1998, Bethesda, Maryland) was a noted U.S. Army officer and OSS/CIA operative. Among other exploits, he was instrumental in the November 1963 coup against Ngô Đình Diệm that resulted in Diệm’s assassination, having served as Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.’s liaison officer with the coup plotters and delivering $42,000 of the known cash disbursements.  He later ran secret operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Although the FBI said that additional possible records could exist, they claim they could not find/locate them.

 Cameron, Donald Ewen – [21 Pages, 8.3MB] – Donald Ewen Cameron (24 December 1901 – 8 September 1967) — known as D. Ewen Cameron or Ewen Cameron — was a Scottish-born psychiatrist who served as President of the American Psychiatric Association (1952–1953), Canadian Psychiatric Association (1958-1959), American Psychopathological Association (1963), Society of Biological Psychiatry (1965) and World Psychiatric Association (1961-1966). In spite of his high professional reputation, he has been criticized for administering electroshock therapy and experimental drugs to patients without their informed consent. Some of this work took place in the context of the Project MKUltra mind control program.

Clarridge, Duane –  [17 Pages, 2.8MB] – Duane Ramsdell “Dewey” Clarridge (April 16, 1932 – April 9, 2016) was an American senior operations officer for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and supervisor for more than 30 years. Clarridge was the chief of the Latin American division from 1981 to 1987 and a key figure in the Iran-Contra Affair.

George, Clair– FBI Release #1 –  [64 Pages, 9MB]George, Clair – FBI Release #2 –  [64 Pages, 2.2MB] – Clair Elroy George (August 3, 1930 – August 11, 2011) was a prominent American intelligence officer in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Over his three-decade career, he became known for his expertise in espionage and counterintelligence, holding several key positions, including Deputy Director for Operations. George played a pivotal role during the Cold War, overseeing clandestine operations globally. His career was marked by controversy during the Iran-Contra affair, where he was indicted for perjury and obstruction of justice, though later pardoned by President George H.W. Bush. Clair George’s legacy remains a significant chapter in the history of U.S. intelligence operations.

 Gottlieb, Sidney – FBI Release #1 – [43 Pages, 15.4MB] – Sidney Gottlieb (born Joseph Scheider; August 3, 1918 – March 7, 1999) was an American chemist and spymaster best known for his involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency’s 1950s and ’60s assassination attempts and mind control program, known as Project MKUltra.

 Harvey, William King – [376 Pages, 172 MB] – William King “Bill” Harvey (September 13, 1915 – June 9, 1976) was a Central Intelligence Agency officer, best known for his role in Operation Mongoose. He was known as “America’s James Bond”, a tag given to him by Edward Lansdale.

 Helms, Richard – [342 Pages, 190 MB] Helms, Richard – Letter stating additional FBI Records were destroyed – [2 Pages, 0.4MB]Richard McGarrah Helms (March 30, 1913 – October 23, 2002) served as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from June 1966 to February 1973. Helms began intelligence work with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. Following the 1947 creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) he rose in its ranks during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. Helms then served as DCI under Johnson, then Nixon.

 Maheu, Robert – [1,151 Pages, 852MB] – (Note: This is a large file. It is recommended you right click and select “save as” instead of opening in a browser).Continue scrolling for more…

Robert Aime Maheu (October 30, 1917 – August 4, 2008) was an American businessman and lawyer, who worked for the FBI and CIA, and as the chief executive of Nevada operations for the industrialist Howard Hughes. Maheu said: “The CIA was my first steady client, giving me ‘cut-out’ assignments [those jobs in which the Agency could not officially be involved].”

Marchetti, Victor– [30 Pages, 2.2MB] – Victor Leo Marchetti, Jr. (December 23, 1929-October 19, 2018) was a special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who later became a prominent critic of the United States Intelligence Community and the Israel lobby in the United States.

 McCone, John – [746 Pages, 46.4MB] – John Alexander McCone (January 4, 1902 – February 14, 1991) was an American businessman and politician who served as Director of Central Intelligence during the height of the Cold War.  After the disaster of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, president John F. Kennedy forced the resignation of the CIA director Allen Dulles and some of his staff. McCone replaced Dulles on November 29, 1961.

Millis, John I. – [184 Pages, 103MB] – John I. Millis was a former case officer with the Central Intelligence Agency who also served as the top staff member of the House Intelligence Committee.

Montgomery, Hugh – [746 Pages, 46.4MB] – Hugh Montgomery (November 29, 1923 – April 6, 2017) was a United States diplomat and intelligence officer. He served for 63 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and has been called one of the CIA’s founding fathers.

 Paisley, John – [297 Pages, 183.3MB] – John Arthur Paisley (August 25, 1923 – September 24, 1978) was a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency.  Paisley served in the CIA from 1963 to 1974. During his career, he was heavily involved in Soviet operations. Paisley retired as deputy director in the Office of Strategic Research, the branch that monitored Soviet military movements and nuclear capabilities.

Shackley, Theodore “Ted” – [340 Pages, 96MB] – Theodore George “Ted” Shackley, Jr. (July 16, 1927 — December 9, 2002) was an American CIA officer involved in many important and controversial CIA operations during the 1960s and 1970s. He is one of the most decorated CIA officers. Due to his “light hair and mysterious ways”, Shackley was known to his colleagues as “the Blond Ghost”. Note: There are 1,092 (approximate) additional pages which will require $40 to get. Please CONTACT if you are interested in sponsoring the file.

Tofte, Hans – FBI Release #1 – [33 Pages, 3.4MB]Tofte, Hans – FBI Release #2 – [41 Pages, 5.4MB] – Hans V. Tofte (1911–1987) was a Danish-American intelligence officer who played a significant role in Allied and U.S. covert operations during and after World War II. Born in Copenhagen, he fled Nazi-occupied Europe and joined the British Special Operations Executive, training guerrilla fighters in Burma and China. He later served with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Yugoslavia and Italy, where he supported resistance groups and earned the Legion of Merit. After the war, he joined the CIA and became known for bold paramilitary missions, including a 1951 operation that intercepted medical supplies bound for Chinese forces in Korea. Tofte was also involved in Cold War operations in Latin America, including the 1954 coup in Guatemala. His CIA career ended in 1966 amid controversy over classified documents found in his home. He retired with his pension and lived out his final years in New York, passing away in 1987.

White, George Hunter FBI Release #1 (to The Black Vault) – [53 Pages, 3.5MB]
 White, George Hunter FBI Release #1 (third party requester, archived here for reference) – [19 Pages, 12.9MB] White, George Hunter FBI Release #2 (third party requester, archived here for reference) – [31 Pages, 20.7MB] – George Hunter White was a CIA operative who had worked on the MKULTRA / Mind Control projects.  He was also heavily involved in the previous OSS “truth drug” experiments.
 

Wilson, Edwin Paul – [651 Pages, 304MB] – Edwin Paul Wilson (May 3, 1928 – September 10, 2012) was a former CIA and Office of Naval Intelligence officer who was convicted in 1983 of illegally selling weapons to Libya. It was later found that the United States Department of Justice and the CIA had covered up evidence in the case. Wilson’s convictions were overturned in 2003 and he was freed the following year.

A released Department of Defense document, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act,provides a rare and candid look inside the Soviet leadership’s strategic mindset during the Cold War.The 152-page file compiles firsthand interviews with senior Soviet military officials, policymakers, and Western counterparts, exposing a mix of overestimation, fear, and internal debate that shaped the era’sarms race and nuclear brinkmanship.
Conducted primarily in the early 1990s, the interviews were part of a formal study by the Office of Net Assessment, drawing on the testimony of Soviet officers such as Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, General Andriian Danilevich, and Western figures including former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.The collection offers new insight into how both sides viewed nuclear deterrence,the potential for war, and the logic behind massive arms buildups.
Soviet Doubts About Nuclear WarfightingContinue scrolling for more…

The document reveals that, by the 1970s, leading Soviet military thinkers had concluded that nuclear weapons were not true warfighting tools, but rather political instruments of deterrence. “At no time did the USSR ever intend to make first use of nuclear weapons,” Marshal Akhromeev told U.S. researchers, explaining that although a preemptive attack would offer an advantage in theory, neither side would actually win if nuclear war began. He described nuclear arms as “political tools,” and noted that both superpowers’ command and control systems for nuclear forces reached full reliability only in themid-1970s, greatly reducing the risk of unauthorized or accidental use.
General Danilevich described how the results of secret Soviet computer models, shown to Brezhnevand other Politburo members in the early 1970s, predicted catastrophic devastation after a nuclear exchange. According to the unpublished findings, the Soviet armed forces would be “reduced to 1/1000 of their previous strength,” with 80 million Soviet citizens killed and 85% of industrial capacity destroyed. Danilevich recalled that Brezhnev was “visibly terrified” by the exercise and had to be reassured that it was not a real launch. The summary of this study was never published, as its message was judged “too psychologically detrimental to morale and resolve.” Instead, later models artificially reduced predicted destruction to make nuclear war appear less suicidal, a practice that continued into the 1980s.
Strategic Misperceptions and Internal Rivalries
The interviews point to a persistent pattern of misreading the other side’s intentions. Akhromeev, who was initially distrustful of the U.S., said that face-to-face meetings with American generals in the late 1980s changed his views, revealing that both sides had long misunderstood each other’s actual policies and motivations. “Each side made a tremendous misreading of the other side’s intentions, which led to a greater possibility of accidental strikes,” he said, but added that there was never an imminent danger of war in the 1970–87 period.
The document also details internal disputes within the Soviet leadership, especially between the General Staff, political authorities, and the powerful industrial sector. General Batenin recalled deep tensions between military planners and party leaders over decisions such as force structure and the production of new weapons, with disagreement over whether quantity or quality should be prioritized. The interviews highlight that subjective factors, political alliances, and personal relationships often overrode technical analysis in weapons procurement and strategy.
Economic Pressure and Arms Buildup
A recurring theme in the interviews is the immense economic burden of the Soviet arms race. Sergei Blagovolin, who worked on assessing the U.S. industrial mobilization potential, recalled that Soviet planners estimated the U.S. could produce “50 nuclear submarines and 50,000 tanks per year” in a mobilization scenario. These threat assessments were used for decades to justify vast increases in Soviet military spending and production, which ultimately contributed to the economic strains that weakened the USSR in the 1980s.
Chemical and New Weapons
On chemical weapons, both Soviet and U.S. interviewees agreed that the USSR maintained large stockpiles as a “secondary means” of warfare, to be used only if nuclear escalation could be avoided or in retaliation. Soviet planners consistently matched U.S. capabilities, but chemical weapons were viewed as fundamentally less decisive than nuclear arms.
There is also acknowledgment that both superpowers tracked and attempted to match technological innovations—such as cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, and laser-based weapons—but economic and political realities limited their actual impact on the nuclear balance.
Political Leadership and Decision-Making
The interviews note the sometimes limited military experience of Soviet political leaders, with Brezhnev described as “very weak in the area of military decision making,” often leaving key decisions to the Minister of Defense and the General Staff. Final choices on weapons development and arms control frequently reflected a compromise between military advice, party priorities, and the interests of the defense industry.
Lasting Lessons
The released record offers a rare, unfiltered view of the late Cold War from the perspective of both Soviet and Western insiders. The testimony shows that, beneath the rhetoric and buildup, both sides recognized the catastrophic potential of nuclear war and relied on deterrence—not victory—as the true goal. The collection reveals how misperceptions, internal politics, and economic exhaustion shaped the course of the Cold War, and how close both superpowers came to the brink while ultimately avoiding direct conflict.
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Document Archive
The Crowded Path to Unlimited Soviet Arsenals: What Soviet Party Leaders, General Staff, and Industrialists Thought They Were Doing in the Cold War [153 Pages, 6.5MB]

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