On the night of November 28 the Ukrainian armed forces deployed so-called Sea Baby Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea and specifically attacked two tankers, believed to be part of Russia’s alleged shadow fleet. This fleet, made up of aging oil tankers flying under flags of convenience, is used by Russia to circumvent the oil embargo’s that has been put in place by Western countries.
The Ukrainian drones struck the oil tankers Kairos and Virat in the vicinity if the Turkish Straits. Both vessels were empty at the time of the attack and heading towards the Russian oil terminal located at Novorossiysk to load oil. The Kiaros was coming from Egypt and was attacked 28 nautical miles offshore the Turkish coast. The vessel suffered an explosion and fire, disabling the vessel. The second vessel, Virat, was struck near the engine room but is reported as in stable condition.
With these strikes, the Ukrainians are opening a new phase in the maritime war in the Black Sea whereby Ukrainian USVs are targeting Shadow Fleet tankers, possibly to dissuade other ships belonging to the Shadow Fleet to no longer head to Russian ports.
So far, no major reactions were recorded expect for Kazakhstan and Turkey. Kazakhstan complaints are however directed against the Ukrainian drone attacks that disabled the CPC oil terminal at Novorossiysk. This terminal is a major outlet not only for Russian but also counts for 80% Kazakh crude exports.
Turkey’s response was aimed to the fact that both Ukrainian USV attacks took place within Turkey’s Exclusive E Economic Zone (EEZ), posing a risk to navigation, life, property, and environmental safety. In both attacks, Turkish rescue services had to intervene to control the fire and damage and rescue the crew. In the case of the Kiaros, the rescue vessels Kurtama-12 and Nene Hatun had to be deployed.
Russia strongly condemned the attacks but so far has not been able to formulate a strong response to the Ukrainian drone attacks.
The attacks coincided with a third incident, involving the Panamanian-flagged oil tanker Mersin, which started sinking near the coast of Dakar, Senegal. This tanker reportedly docked at Taman, Russia, in August and then headed for Togo. The vessel then remained stationary near Senegal with a last AIS signal reported on November 25. No official cause of the sinking was reported, leaving it unknown if the tanker suffered mechanical problems or was sabotaged.
A new phase in the maritime war
It appears that Ukraine is testing the waters and see if the direct attacks against the Shadow Fleet will meet relevant opposition. Should such opposition lack, it might encourage Ukraine to step up its attack and keep attacking Shadow Fleet tankers as they pass through the Black Sea. By striking the Shadow Fleet tankers in the Black Sea, Ukraine is hoping to impose a blockade of Russian oil exports in the Black Sea, putting further economic pressure on the Kremlin following regular strikes against Russia’s energy sector such as power grids and refineries.
So far, opposition against the Ukrainian USV attack is lacking though with only Turkey, Kazakhstan and Russia specifically condemning the attacks. Given the fact that Turkey is an important partner for Ukraine both in military cooperation and political support in the form of mediation between Ukraine and Russia; Ukraine will possibly take Turkey’s objections in account and could refrain from striking Shadow Fleet tankers as they pass through the Turkish EEZ. However, Ukrainian drones have proven to have the necessary range to reach and attack targets inside the Russian EEZ of the Black Sea.
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet forced to intervene?
Russian Black Sea Fleet’s loses on the naval front of the war (Credit: Author)
Should Ukraine continue to attack Shadow Fleet tankers, the main question will be how Russia will respond. Throughout the war, the Russian Black See Fleet has been struggling to defend itself against Ukrainian naval attacks in the Black Sea Fleet. From March 2022 to May 2024, the Ukrainians were able to cause significant damage to the Black Sea Fleet through the use of missiles and drones. Over the course of two years, the Ukrainians succeeded in sinking or destroying the Slava-class cruiser RFS Moskva, the Improved Kilo-class submarine RFS Rostov-on-Don, the Bykov-class patrol boat RFS Sergey Bykov, the Tarantul-class missile boat RFS Ivanovets, and the Karakurt-class corvette RFS Tsiklon while the Karakurt-class corvette RFS Ashkold has been so thoroughly damaged that a return to service seems unlikely.
This maritime campaign succeeded in pushing the Black Sea Fleet out of the waters near Crimea and forced the fleet to relocate from Sevastopol to the Russian naval base at Novorossiysk. From there, the fleet largely remains in port, only venturing out for small patrols and Kalibr missile strikes against targets deep in Ukraine. But even in those circumstances, Ukrainian drones remain capable of attacking the Black Sea Fleet. Recent attacks took place in the Sea of Azov with Ukrainian drones targeting the radars on board of Russian warships. Though such attacks don’t sink a ship, the constitute as a so-called “soft kill” whereby the vessel has sustained damage at critical systems, rendering it no longer combat effective.
With Ukraine now directly attacking the Shadow Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet could be ordered to sail out and provide protection to tankers moving to and from Russian ports. Currently, the Black Sea Fleet can count on two Grigorovich-class frigates, two Krivak-class frigates, two Buyan-M-class corvettes, two Tarantul-class missile boats, two Bora-class hovercraft, six Grisha-class anti-submarine corvettes, and three Bykov-class patrol boats. In theory, these numbers are sufficient to provide a strong escort for any tankers heading to and from Russian ports at the Black Sea Fleet.
However it remains doubtful if the Black Sea Fleet has the practical skills to execute such escorts. The fleet has been largely confined to port at Novorossiysk, leaving little room for actual training. If the maritime campaign of 2022-2024 is any indication, warships of the Black Sea Fleet appear to be unable to defend themselves during this period as Ukraine preferred to attack ships operating on their own without nearby back-up. Any escort mission the Black Sea Fleet will undertake would therefore require the allocation of several warships simultaneously in order to provide some form of mutual support against Ukrainian drone attacks. Coordination of several vessels simultaneously during a drone attack can be hectic and difficult to pull off even with a streamlined command and trained crew. Also, once at sea, the vessels of the Black Sea Fleet will become a lot more vulnerable to UAV attacks as they operated beyond the range of land based air defense systems. This would significantly expand the scope of operations that the Black Sea Fleet would face once it starts escorting tankers as it has to content with both a seaborne and airborne threat.
Should the Black Sea Fleet commit to escorting tankers, we can speculate that Ukraine will jump on the opportunity to disable and sink several more Russian warships by setting op coordinated and overwhelming drone strikes against the Russian warships. Given the fact that Ukraine has access to Western intelligence, it could receive advanced warning when the Black Sea Fleet would venture out and where its ships are located at sea. NATO observation aircraft are being deployed over the Black Sea at a regular basis, monitoring the maritime situation and collecting intelligence.
So far, the Russian solution has been to instruct vessels to turn off their AIS broadcasts or no longer have them broadcast to which port they are heading. These measures only provide limited protection since these tankers have to pass through the Turkish Straits and have only a very limited amount of ports where they can go to. Any Ukrainian operative in Istanbul can visually observe if Shadow Fleet tankers are entering the Black Sea and report their passage. Given the limited amount of oil terminals, the routes these tankers take is generally known, as well as their general speed. All these factors would allow Ukraine to track and calculate where these tankers could be located once they have entered the Black Sea and then figure out when they cross into the Russian EEZ. USVs could potentially be used in the Turkish EEZ to shadow these tankers and provide Ukraine with real-time updates on their location and heading.